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are amongst the inherent features of 
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12.  Economic growth and financial 
development in Mexico: from a 
virtuous circle of a bidirectional 
causality to a financial 
subordination
Teresa López and Eufemia Basilio
12.1 INTRODUCTION
The historical background of the discussion on the relationship between the 
financial system and economic growth dates back to the work of Bagehot 
(1873 [1999]) and Hicks (1969). They argued that the financial system had 
played a key role in the industrialization of Great Britain, because it facili-
tated the channeling of large amounts of capital for the creation of major 
infrastructure projects. Meanwhile, Schumpeter (1911  [2004]) noted that 
when banks work well they stimulate technological innovation, because 
they have the information required to locate and finance the best invest-
ment projects. He also argued that such projects frequently lead to innova-
tions in production processes and create new products.
A contrary view is that of Joan Robinson (1952), who claimed that 
company development precedes the development of finance, because the 
former is the basis for economic growth. According to this economist, 
economic development stimulates the development of the financial system, 
because the demand for financing stimulates the creation of new instru-
ments and mechanisms of financing, while the financial system automati-
cally responds to that demand.
The controversy about the causal relationship between the development 
of the financial system and economic growth did not end with the devel-
opment and modernization of this system; on the contrary, this and the 
subsequent deregulation of financial systems in the United States, Great 
Britain and Canada in the early years of the 1970s paved the way for the 
revival of the old debate about the aforementioned relationship.
Under the new institutional framework characterized by financial 
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deregulation in the industrialized economies, and which would initiate 
the process of integration of local financial systems, liquidity increased 
dramatically worldwide. These conditions encouraged the governments of 
developing countries in general, and Latin America in particular, to under-
take reforms in the early 1980s to deregulate their economies, in particular 
with regard to the liberalization of the external sector and the financial 
system. These countries included Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and 
Mexico, which became the main destination of flows of short- term capital 
from industrialized countries to developing and emerging economies.
The massive influx of foreign capital was manifested in an increase in 
indicators of financial depth, such as the M4/GDP ratio (FitzGerald, 
2006), which is generally considered an indicator of financial development. 
However, this indicator and others, such as the increase in the credit port-
folio/total assets relationship, was not reflected in increased funding for 
productive activities in developing economies. By contrast, the opening up 
of the capital account as a means of financial integration into international 
financial markets not only led to a contraction of lending to productive 
activities, but also became one of the main sources of financial instabil-
ity due to asymmetries in the size and structure of their financial systems 
compared with those of developed countries. Thus, credit expansion gen-
erated financial instability in general, and fragility in the banking market 
in particular, which led to the exchange rate and banking crises of Mexico 
(1994–1995) and Brazil (1999).
In the case of Mexico, the entry of large amounts of short- term capital 
between 1989 and 1994, attracted by the financial reforms and the sale of 
public enterprises and banks, deepened structural distortions in the func-
tioning of domestic financial channels, such as a poorly developed private 
securities market and high dollarization of liabilities (Studart, 2003). To 
this was added the oligopoly power of banks in the credit market, which 
before financial deregulation was characterized by the financing of private 
partnerships, granting short- term loans, maintaining high amounts of 
government securities and excluding low- and middle- income sectors from 
savings circuits.
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the evolution of the relationship 
between financial development and economic growth in Mexico for the 
period 1990–2013. This analysis is placed within the context of financial 
deregulation and the formal adoption in 2001 of the macroeconomic 
model of inflation targeting. The hypothesis guiding the analysis argues 
that during the period that the Mexican financial system was regulated 
by mechanisms controlling interest rates and selective credit policies, the 
relationship between the financial system and economic growth formed an 
interdependent relationship that gave rise to a virtuous circle. This circle 
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was broken by deregulation and financial liberalization, since the com-
mercial banks in their quest to increase profit margins favored granting 
short- term credit to sectors whose sensitivity to changes in interest rates is 
low, such as consumer credit, and to a lesser extent, the mortgage sector.
The exchange rate and financial crisis of 1994–1995 was the result of 
these practices and the financialization of the resources of commercial 
banks, as this increased their investments in synthetic instruments (deriva-
tives, swaps and so on) and government bonds.
The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 12.2 first presents the 
empirical results of recent research on the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth in the case of Mexico. Section 12.3 
analyses the relationship between the development of the banking system 
and economic growth in Mexico, by constructing a number of statistical 
reasons of financial depth and carrying out a Granger causality test. In 
addition, the behavior of gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) and the 
structure of bank credit is assessed, in order to understand the weakening 
of the intermediation function of commercial banks. Finally, Section 12.4 
sets out the principal conclusions.
12.2  FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH IN MEXICO: A REVIEW OF RECENT 
LITERATURE
Research by Venegas et al. (2009) on the relationship between financial 
development, financial repression and economic growth in Mexico for the 
period 1961–2007 yields results that lead these authors to the following 
conclusions. (1) Financial development had a positive impact on growth; 
however, this was small, that is, a weak unidirectional causal relationship 
between the first and the second is observed. (2) In the long term finan-
cial repression caused a negative effect on economic growth. (3) Financial 
repression has a negative effect on financial development. According to 
the results of this research, the magnitude of the effect of financial repres-
sion on financial development is inversely proportional, but no short- term 
effect could be identified between financial development, financial repres-
sion and economic growth (measured by gross domestic product (GDP)). 
In other words, neither financial repression nor financial development 
affected the short- term dynamics of GDP; similarly, financial repression 
had no impact on financial development in the short term.
These results differ from those of other investigations in the case of 
Mexico, which used the Time Series methodology, such as the work of 
Bandiera et al. (2000), who performed an analysis for Chile, Ghana, 
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Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Turkey and Zimbabwe for the period 
1970–1994, and whose results show a non- significant positive impact of 
interest rates on private savings and that financial repression positively 
influenced financial development, particularly in the increase in private 
savings. According to these authors, the explanation of the negative impact 
of financial development on private savings lies in low incomes and the 
existence of imperfect financial markets.
The study by Arestis and Demetriades (1999) sought to evaluate the 
effects and the causal link between the institutional conditions, financial 
policies and economic growth for a representative sample of industrialized 
and developing countries for the period 1949–1992; in the case of Mexico, 
the existence of a bidirectional causality between financial development 
and economic growth was identified.1
The study by Rodríguez and López (2009) to assess the causal relation-
ship between financial development and economic growth in Mexico for 
the period 1990–2004 yielded results that reinforced the previous inves-
tigations, identifying the presence of a positive bidirectional causal rela-
tionship, although it is unclear what the transmission mechanisms of the 
positive effects of the financial system to economic activity are.
Finally, research by De la Cruz and Alcántara (2011), using the Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) and Error Correction (VEC) techniques for the case 
of Mexico, assessed the existence of a causal link between bank credit and 
the main sectors of economic activity and if  this is a long- term relation-
ship, for the period 1995–2010. The results lead the authors to present 
three conclusions.
First, the only credit that impacts the economy is that allocated to 
consumption and services. While the results do not refute that lending by 
commercial banks has a positive impact on economic activity, the authors 
point out that the positive and long- term relationship between credit and 
economic growth is only sustained by consumer credit. This argument is 
demonstrated with the existence of a bidirectional causality between the 
Global Indicator of Economic Activity (IGAE)2 and consumer credit for 
the years 1993–2010. According to the authors, this ratio is an indicator 
of the penetration of banking into consumption, which has been recorded 
since the early 1990s.
Second, it was found that the growth of consumer credit generated a 
credit bubble prior to the 2009 crisis. In this regard, the authors argue that 
the increase in consumer credit in conditions of low economic growth is 
one factor that underlies financial instability. Hence, they indicate the need 
to establish mechanisms to regulate the banking system.
Third, there is limited interaction between the real sector of the economy 
and the financial system due to two factors: (a) the banking credit granted 
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to the productive sectors registered a downward trend compared with 
consumer credit and (b) the yield of economic activity has been modest 
and weak.
This research shows that the positive effect of consumer credit on 
domestic demand – and to a lesser extent mortgage lending induced by 
federal government policy to stimulate economic growth by constructing 
social housing – is an unsustainable relationship in the long run, because 
this type of credit by itself  does not generate large- scale multiplier effects 
required to reactivate economic activity at the macroeconomic level.
Consequently, to the extent that consumer credit increases at a faster 
rate than the growth in income and employment, this private banking 
strategy will become a source of financial instability.
Just as in the case of empirical research on the international level, 
research into the relationship between financial development and eco-
nomic growth in the case of Mexico is not conclusive. This raises, first, 
the need for a more disaggregated econometric analysis and, second, to 
incorporate other variables to measure both financial development and the 
impact of banking credit on economic growth.
12.2.1  The Relationship Between Financial Development and Economic 
Growth: A Bidirectional and Historical Relationship
In the absence of strong and sufficient empirical evidence that allows us 
to accept that financial development has a unidirectional and positive 
effect on economic growth, we can argue that development of the financial 
system per se does not guarantee economic growth, and nor does it ensure 
that savings in the economy are converted into financing of investment.
Considering the low level of growth registered by the Mexican economy 
since 1996, resulting from the application of a pro- cyclical fiscal policy, 
which is part of the regime of inflation targeting to keep inflation low by 
shrinking domestic demand, we can argue that economic growth depends 
on several factors and not only on the development of the financial system. 
Of course, one of these factors is financing from banks, but other equally 
important – or perhaps even more so – factors exist, such as the growth of 
effective demand and employment, because these factors generate positive 
earnings expectations, which in turn determine new investment decisions.
In accordance with the foregoing, we propose that the causal link 
between the financial development and growth of an economy is the result 
of a process that is mutually determined, that is, which is bidirectional. 
In this regard, we share the view of Schumpeter (1911 [2004]) who held 
that when banks operate ‘well’, that is, when credit reaches all the produc-
tive sectors, and especially the sectors driving growth and technological 
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innovation, the financial system becomes important for economic growth. 
In addition, we agree with the approach of Joan Robinson (1952) who 
argued that development of firms precedes the development of finance, 
because, according to the Keynesian framework she employed, the devel-
opment of firms implies economic growth, and this entails the expansion 
of investment. To the extent that the effective demand rises, the profits 
of the companies will be realized and, as a result, the reinvestment of 
profits will increase and internal savings, as a remainder, will rise. This 
will promote the development of financial systems in a manner that will 
depend on the structure and historical development of each country.
Historically, economic development stimulated the modernization of 
financial systems, as demand for financing from companies induced banks 
to create new instruments and funding mechanisms with the aim of gen-
erating greater liquidity and reducing the lag time between the deposits 
(usually short term) and credit (usually medium and long term). This inter-
dependent relationship established a virtuous circle, that is, a process with 
bidirectional causality, which was strengthened with the establishment of 
mechanisms for monitoring and control of financial operations in general 
and banking in particular.
This view is implicit in the historical analysis of Chick (1993) on the evo-
lution of banks, to understand the endogenous nature of money and the 
institutional and policy changes of central banks. This approach is comple-
mented by the contributions of Toporowski (2001, 2013) on the historical 
character of technological innovations in the financial system, which are 
inherent to the development of capitalism.
The virtuous circle between financial development and economic growth 
is broken by the removal of regulatory and supervisory mechanisms for 
financial activities. For developed economies, the interdependence between 
financial development and economic growth lasted nearly four decades, if  
we consider that in 1933 the Glass- Steagall Act (Banking Act) came into 
force in the United States, and that the regulations contained in this Act 
were weakened in the early 1970s to make way for the liberalization of its 
financial system.3
In the case of developing economies, this relationship held for more 
than three decades, as the financial regulatory systems were generally 
established in the early 1940s as part of the policies adopted to boost the 
process of industrialization of these economies, and these were eliminated 
in the first years of the 1980s, in the context of the debt crisis experienced 
by several economies in Latin America, including Mexico.
The policies of deregulation and liberalization of national financial 
systems by eliminating the prudential oversight and mechanisms of 
control over deposit and lending rates and channeling of credit to priority 
M3954 LEVY TEXT.indd   218 01/04/2016   11:46
 Economic growth and financial development in Mexico  219
economic activities, caused the bidirectional relationship that had formed 
between growth economic and modernization of the financial system to 
became a vicious circle, as the new technological innovations that marked 
the development of financial systems led to a reduction in funding for 
productive investment. In other words, the development of the financial 
system was separated from the financing needs of the real economy.
12.3  LIBERALIZATION AND FINANCIAL DEPTH 
VERSUS FINANCING ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 
MEXICO
This section analyses a number of statistical and graphical indicators on 
the relationship between financial development and economic growth in 
the case of Mexico, in the context of financial deregulation and the full 
adoption in 2001 of the macroeconomic model of inflation targeting.
12.3.1  Monetary Stability with Low Economic Growth: A 
Macroeconomic View
Over the long period between 1950 and 1976, under a regulated financial 
system and countercyclical management of fiscal policy centered on public 
investment in basic infrastructure and the production of basic goods 
and services through public companies, the Mexican economy grew at a 
rate of between 4 and 7 percent, as an annual average. During the period 
1958–1970, known as the ‘stabilizing development’, sustained growth meant 
that monetary stability was achieved, accompanied by low primary deficits 
of 2 percent as a proportion of GDP, as an annual average (López, 2010).
In a macroeconomic context marked by severe recession and financial 
fragility generated by the oil boom years of 1979–1982, which led to the 
outbreak of the debt crisis, the rhythm of stable and sustained growth 
was interrupted. Beginning in 1983, stabilization policies and orthodox 
macroeconomic adjustment were implemented to address the severe reces-
sion and inflationary pressures. In parallel, economic reforms were imple-
mented aimed at deregulating the economy, and specifically the financial 
and external sectors.
Liquidity problems and restrictions on access to external financing 
exacerbated the recessionary and inflationary effects generated by the 
external debt crisis of 1982. In 1988, structural reforms accelerated under 
the argument that it was necessary to create the institutional and economic 
conditions to permit the adoption of a macroeconomic strategy based on 
export growth and on the dynamics of the private sector of the economy. 
M3954 LEVY TEXT.indd   219 01/04/2016   11:46
220 The financialization response to economic disequilibria
This meant accelerating the economic and institutional reforms that were 
initiated in 1983, that is, the deregulation of the financial system and liber-
alization of the external sector, in order to make progress with the elimina-
tion of state involvement in economic activity (Solís, 1996).
From 1983 to 2013, GDP has grown at a low and irregular rate, since 
the phases of expansion are very short in duration, and growth has been 
no more than 2 percent as an annual average, while the recessionary phases 
are very deep with a longer recovery time; without approaching the rate 
of growth recorded in the period of stabilizing development. The stability 
of prices and balance in public finances recorded since 2000 is the result of 
the containment of economic growth by way of reduced domestic demand.
12.3.2  The Vicious Circle, Financial Depth and Low Financing of 
Productive Activities
Various indicators have been constructed to measure the degree of finan-
cial development (M4/GDP, portfolio credit/total credit, total credit/total 
assets and so on). For the purposes of this chapter we have taken as a proxy 
measure the M4/GDP ratio in nominal terms, agreeing with the arguments 
of Asteriou and Price (2000) insofar as M4 is a broad measure of money 
and the (M4/GDP) index increases (decreases) over time if  the develop-
ment of the financial system accelerates (decelerates) compared to the real 
sector of the economy.
Figure 12.1 shows that there is no relationship between the natural loga-
rithm (Ln) of the M4/GDP ratio and real GDP growth, and this decou-
pling has deepened since 2000. Since 2005, the depth and development of 
the financial system resumes the upward trend that began in 1990, with 
the exception of 1994–1995 and 2002–2004, in response to the acceleration 
of the deregulation process in the sector. In nominal terms, the M4/GDP 
ratio was 35.75 on average in 1990, and 70.45 percent in 2013. Considering 
this extraordinary increase, we might say that the Mexican financial system 
has undergone a high rate of development; however, this contrasts with 
the weak and uneven growth of GDP per capita and total GDP. The latter 
recorded sharp declines in 1995, 2001, 2009 and 2013, while the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita shows an accelerated declining trend. The 
improvement recorded by this indicator over the years in which the growth 
rate of real GDP fell is a result of the combination of an increase in the 
population (numerator) and a drastic drop in the real growth rate of GDP 
(denominator). This is demonstrated by the fact that when the GDP grows, 
the GDP per capita decreases.
In general, this latter indicator registered a downward trend over the 
period 1990–2013, as a result of low and irregular growth of GDP.
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As for the capital/labor ratio, estimated with the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of GFCF and the economically active population, it shows rapid 
growth during the 1994–2001 period, and following a fall in 2002, after 
2003 it indicates weak growth with a tendency to stagnation (Figure 12.1).
After the currency and financial crisis of 1994–1995, the GFCF, as 
a share of GDP, has seen a gradual decline; in 1990, it accounted for 
29  percent, while by 2000 this percentage drops to 27 percent. Over 
13 years this trend has increased: from 26 percent in 2001, the percentage 
dropped to 21 percent in 2013. This suggests a direct and positive relation-
ship between growth of GFCF and GDP, with a certain lag shown by the 
first with respect to changes in GDP, which is explained by the periods 
of maturation of new fixed assets incorporated into economic activity 
(Figure 12.2).
These data lead us to argue that, on the one hand, the contraction of 
GFCF as a share of GDP has been one of the determinants of the low 
and irregular growth of the Mexican economy and, on the other, that 
the greater depth or development of the financial system, as measured by 
the M4/GDP ratio, has led to its detachment from the real sector of the 
economy; that is, the Mexican banking system has ceased to fulfill the role 
of financing investment.
Following the exchange rate and financial crisis of 1994–1995, com-
mercial banks increased the rationing of credit to productive activities. 
This reduction was due to several factors. At the microeconomic level, 
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Figure 12.1  Mexico: economic growth in terms of GDP and the capital 
and labor ratio
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commercial banking reactivated its strategy of short- term profit by 
increasing credit to highly profitable sectors, such as consumer credit. The 
high moral risk of these sectors is more than offset by high interest rates 
and the fees charged by them, particularly credit cards. These conditions 
and the low elasticity of this type of credit to changes in interest rates have 
turned consumer credit into one of the main sources of income for com-
mercial banking. This is despite the high levels of non- performing loans 
that are often recorded with this type of credit.
At the macroeconomic level, the policy of sterilized intervention in the 
foreign exchange market by the Bank of Mexico, intended to avoid sudden 
variations in the level of the monetary base, and thus to maintain a stable 
nominal exchange rate has contributed to the contraction of credit to pro-
ductive sectors. In this sense, the issuance of government bonds has not 
only become an important component of the monetary policy of inflation 
targeting, but also become a source of high and secure profits for com-
mercial banks, since the rate yielded by these instruments is higher than 
the external rate.
This, coupled with the uncertainty about the recovery of economic 
activity, generated largely by the practice of pro- cyclical fiscal policy and 
high lending rates, are two factors that inhibit the demand for credit by 
companies. Table 12.1 shows that credit to the private sector increased in 
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Figure 12.2  Mexico: economic growth in terms of GDP and gross fixed 
capital formation
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Table 12.1  Mexico’s commercial banking distribution of total credit,a 
1990–2013, percentage structure
Year Total Private sector Other 
sectorsc
Total Total 
private 
sector
Agricultural 
sector
Industrial 
sector
Services 
sector, other 
activities and 
consumptionb
Housing 
credit
1990 100.0 91.56 11.54 35.85 34.81  9.35 8.44
1993 100.0 96.72 9.35 30.23 35.54 21.60 3.28
1996 100.0 86.08 5.47 24.37 31.81 24.43 10.79
1999 100.0 72.25 4.06 20.20 24.69 23.30 25.83
2002 100.0 65.24 2.15 16.70 29.89 16.51 33.86
2004* 100.0 68.92 2.07 16.28 36.52 14.04 31.08
2005 100.0 73.75 1.93 15.51 41.85 14.46 26.25
2008** 100.0 85.13 1.61 18.43 48.51 16.59 14.87
2011 100.0 81.28 1.54 20.75 41.81 17.18 18.72
2013 100.0 81.69 1.77 19.94 43.69 16.30 18.31
Notes:
a.  From July 1995, includes subsidiaries of foreign banks operating in Mexico. 
Information after December 2004 does not include data from banks in the process of 
liquidation or bankruptcy.
b.  Until 1994, the heading ‘Commerce’ was used instead. In 1994, using a new 
methodology the heading ‘Consumption’ was created. In order to construct a series for 
1990–2013, we include in the heading ‘Services sector and other activities’ the credit for 
Commerce for the years 1990–93. This accounts for part of the increase in the share of 
total credit by the ‘Services sector and other activities’ for the years 1990–93.
c.  This heading includes the domestic financial sector, not including inter- bank loans; 
the public sector from 1994, where credit to the government includes governmental 
programs to support debtors, loans to public administration, defense and social 
security services of the federal government; ADE support programs, state and 
municipal governments, the government of the Federal District and public, state and 
decentralized bodies and corporations; it refers to the financing granted to long- 
term productive infrastructure projects both in Mexican and foreign currencies and 
includes PIDIREGAS, IPAB and FONADIN and the Fideicomiso Fondo Nacional de 
Infraestructura D.O.F. 7/02/2008 (previously FARAC), the external sector, including 
services for international and offshore financial and non- financial bodies, and inter- 
bank loans.
*  Information after December 2004 does not include data from banks in the process of 
liquidation or bankruptcy; 
**  from March 2008 commercial banking is presented consolidated with its subsidiaries 
the SOFOM Regulated Entities (ER) and credit cards (Tarjetas Banamex, Santander 
Consumo, Ixe Tarjetas and Sociedad Financiera Inbursa), which increases the figures 
for consumer credit. In addition, as a result of this consolidation, the balances of credit 
granted to non- bank financial intermediaries are reduced.
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Bank of Mexico.
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the early 1990s; however, following the 1994–1995 banking crisis a gradual 
decline was recorded, until 2004. In 1990, credit to the private sector 
accounted for 92 percent of total credit provided by commercial banks; by 
2004 this percentage had dropped to 69 percent, that is, a fall of 23 percent-
age points in 14 years. Although a slow recovery in credit to the private 
sector has been observed since 2005, it has not recovered the level of 1990, 
and by 2013 credit to the private sector stood at 82 percent.
The contraction of credit was more severe for the industrial and agricul-
tural sectors – particularly for the latter – while the services and consumer 
sectors have maintained a high share of total bank credit. Nevertheless, 
lending to these sectors has also fallen; from 82 percent in 1990, it fell to 
65 percent in 2013 (Table 12.1). This reduction coincides with an increase 
in holdings of government bonds and investments in synthetic instruments 
(derivatives, swaps and so on) by commercial banks.
In short, the current structure of Mexican commercial banking has the 
following characteristics: (1) the dominance of foreign capital and a high 
concentration of assets and liabilities in the four largest banks; (2) the 
consolidation of the dual power of the market: the oligopolistic power in 
the credit market that allows it to set rates above the rates of government 
securities and foreign lending rates, and the oligopsonistic power of the 
deposits market to set deposit interest rates lower than government bonds; 
(3) the strengthening of their rentier and speculative character, which has 
become a permanent source of financial instability; (4) weak financial 
intermediation with productive activities and high profit margins despite 
lowering intermediation costs; and (5) increasing dollarization of bank 
liabilities.
12.3.3  Empirical Evidence on the Causal Relationship Between Financial 
Development and Economic Growth
Table 12.2 presents the results of the Granger causality tests on the rela-
tionship between financial development and economic growth, the first 
measured by the M4/GDP ratio, and the second by GDP, for the period 
2000–2013.4 The result for the causal link between M4 and GDP for the 
period 1990–2013 shows that the x2 statistic is significant at 5 percent, 
meaning that M4 cannot be considered exogenous. Since it meets the 
requirement for endogeneity of this variable, we can argue that it is GDP 
growth that determines financial development.
The result for the ratio between bank assets – which is another variable 
used to measure financial development – and GDP per capita, for the 
period 2000–2013, also shows that the causality runs from the latter to the 
former, because, just as in the previous case, the x2 statistic is significant at 
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5 percent. This implies that bank assets cannot be considered exogenous 
and, therefore, the requirement for endogeneity of the bank assets variable 
is met.
The result for the relation between bank liabilities, as an indicator of 
financial development, and GDP, with the probability of this causality 
being significant at 5 percent, again shows that economic growth is what 
determines economic activity.
Finally, the result for the causal link between bank credit, another indi-
cator of financial development, and GDP per capita is presented, the x2 
statistic being significant at 5 percent, as in the three previous cases, shows 
that the causality runs the GDP per capita to bank credit, which means 
that bank credit cannot be considered exogenous, and hence the require-
ment of endogeneity of this variable is met.
Based on these results of the Granger causality tests, we can argue that 
in the case of Mexico, the banking sector was no longer a major source of 
financing for economic growth during the years 2000–2013. Figure 12.3 
shows the spread between GDP per capita and credit to the private sector, 
which accounts for the decoupling of the development or depth of the 
banking system and the financing of economic activity in Mexico.
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Source: Authors’ own work using econometrics package Eviews 8.
Figure 12.3 Mexico: private credit and GDP per capita
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Considering that this lack of coordination between the financial sphere 
and the real economy arises in the context of increasing foreign ownership 
of commercial banks, and coincides with the acceleration of the mod-
ernization process and depth of the financial system, it is clear that the 
development of the financial system, if  we understand that to mean mod-
ernization and depth, is not in itself  a guarantee of increased financing for 
economic growth, and nor does it ensure that savings in the economy are 
converted into financing for investment. Also, the expansion of consumer 
credit and mortgages in a context of low growth and high unemployment 
represents a source of financial instability, because their multiplier effects 
are very limited and temporary.
The pro- cyclical practice of fiscal policy under the inflation targeting 
regime, which in Mexico was adopted in full in 2001, has greatly contrib-
uted to the formation of a vicious circle between financial development 
and economic growth. On the one hand, the low and uneven economic 
growth justifies commercial banks rationing credit to businesses, and these 
in turn reducing their demand for credit due to uncertainty about future 
earnings. On the other, this situation warrants commercial banks expand-
ing consumer credit and increasing their investments in government bonds 
and derivative instruments, which provides high yields.
These results allow us to argue that there is a bidirectional relationship 
between financial development and growth, and that this can be positive 
or negative. The latter question will depend on macroeconomic behav-
ior, economic policy – particularly fiscal and monetary policies – and 
institutional factors such as the existence of  a regulatory framework and 
oversight of  financial transactions in general, and banking operations in 
particular.
12.4 CONCLUSIONS
The deregulation of the Mexican financial system caused a contraction of 
credit for productive activities and deepened the rentier and speculative 
character of Mexican commercial banks. The latter ceased to fulfill their 
historic intermediary role, that is, for the financing of productive activities 
and therefore economic growth.
The concentration of assets and liabilities in four major financial groups 
led by foreign capital is the result of the policies of deregulation and liber-
alization, which assumed a priori that the removal of control and oversight 
mechanisms would automatically lead to an increase in domestic and 
foreign savings, and efficient integration of the Mexican financial system 
into international financial markets.
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A review of the literature on the relationship between financial develop-
ment and economic growth both generally and in the case of Mexico pro-
duces inconclusive results suggesting that the financial system determines 
economic growth. In the case of Mexico, the reducing or rationing of credit 
to productive activities is parallel to the process of financial liberalization.
The reduction of bank credit to productive sectors, such as the indus-
trial and agricultural sectors, in the context of weak growth caused by 
the macroeconomic policy of inflation targeting, establishes the vicious 
circle linking modernization and liberalization of the financial system and 
low economic growth. Low expectations about the future growth of the 
economy discourage new investment decisions, a situation that is height-
ened by high interest rates and credit rationing productive activities.
In a context of low GDP growth and employment, provision of con-
sumer and mortgage credit is not the best strategy to induce growth in 
domestic demand, because their multiplier effects are weak in these con-
ditions, and in the medium term they can become a source of financial 
instability, because consumer and mortgage credit grows at a faster pace 
than income, which will raise the ratio of non- performing loans held by 
commercial banks.
NOTES
1. The sample of countries comprises France, Germany, United Kingdom, Japan, United 
States, South Korea, India, Greece, Spain, Turkey, Mexico and Chile. In the case of 
Mexico, the period was 1951–1992.
2. The Global Indicator of Economic Activity (IGAE) shows the evolution of the real 
sector of the economy in the short term. IGAE monthly figures are available from 
January 1993.
3. Strong criticism of the Glass- Steagall Act, generally known as the Banking Law Act, con-
sidering it an obstacle to the adjustment of the US banking system to the development 
of international financial markets, eventually led to its repeal in November 1999, and the 
approval of the Financial Services Modernization Act, also known as the Gramm- Leach- 
Bliley Act.
4. It is important to note that the limited availability of data for a short period of analysis 
(2000–2013) did not allow us to build a vector autoregression (VAR) model, which is gen-
erally used for assessing causality between financial development and economic growth. 
For this reason, we used the simple Engler- Granger technique to allow us to strengthen 
the statistical and graphical analysis presented. The Granger causality test assumes that 
the relevant information for the prediction of the variables to determine, X and Y, is 
contained solely in the time series data on these variables. The test involves the following 
estimates:
  Yt 5 an
i51
aiXt21 1 an
j51
biYt2 j 1 u1t (12.1)
 Xt 5 an
i51
giXt21 1 an
j51
diYt2 j 1 u2t (12.2)
 (12.1)
 
 Yt 5 an
i51
aiXt21 1 an
j51
biYt2 j 1 u1t (12.1)
 Xt 5 an
i51
giXt21 1 an
j51
diYt2 j 1 u2t (12.2) (12.2)
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 where it is assumed that the perturbations u1t and u2t are not correlated. Equation 
(12.1) postulates that the current value of  Y is related to past values of  Y, as well 
as with those of  X. Equation (12.2) postulates a similar behavior for X. Four pos-
sible types of  Granger causality are distinguished (Gujarati, 2001). (1) Unidirectional 
causality from X to Y, where the estimated coefficients on the lagged X in (12.1) are 
statistically different from zero when considered in a group, that is, ∑ai ≠ 0 and the 
set of  estimated coefficients on the lagged Y in (12.2) is not statistically different from 
zero, that is, ∑ai 5 0. (2) Conversely, the unidirectional causality of Y to X exists if  the 
set of  coefficients of  the lagged X in (12.1) are not statistically different from zero, that 
is, ∑ai 5 0 and the set of  coefficients of  the lagged Y in (12.2) is statistically different 
from zero, that is, ∑ai ≠ 0. (3) Feedback, or bilateral causality, is what occurs when the 
coefficient sets of  X and Y are statistically significant, and different from zero, in both 
cases. (4) Independence exists when the sets of  coefficients X and Y are not statistically 
significant in both cases.
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